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A Class Action Securities Fraud Claim Brought
Under State Law by Holders of Securities Is
Preempted by a Federal Act Purporting to
Encompass Claims Brought by Purchasers and
Sellers: Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
v. Dabit
SECURITIES LAW - CLASS ACTIONS - PREEMPTION OF
STATE-LAW CLAIMS - The United States Supreme Court held
that the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act language "in
connection with the purchase or sale of ... a security" encom-
passes the holding of securities and results in the preemption of
state law.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S. Ct.
1503 (2006).
Respondent Shadi Dabit filed a class action against Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., alleging a breach of fiduciary
duty and covenant of good faith and fair dealing.1 The class in-
cluded Dabit, a former Merrill Lynch broker, and all other brokers
who purchased certain stocks for themselves or clients between
December 1, 1999, and December 31, 2000, while employed at
Merrill Lynch. 2 Dabit contended that fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions by Merrill Lynch caused the class to hold on to overvalued
securities, resulting in investment losses and lost clientele.
3
Instead of advancing the claim under federal securities laws,
Dabit invoked diversity jurisdiction and brought suit under Okla-
homa state law. 4 Merrill Lynch moved to dismiss the complaint,
arguing that Title I of the Securities Litigation Uniform Stan-
1. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S. Ct. 1503, 1507 (2006).
2. Merrill Lynch, 126 S. Ct. at 1507.
3. Id. Dabit alleged that research analysts - at the direction of management - dis-
tributed overly confident appraisals of stock values, upon which the brokers based their
own investment decisions and advice to their investor clients. Id. As a result, the brokers
and clients held their stocks beyond the point where they would have sold had they known





dards Act of 1998 (SLUSA) 5 preempted the state law action. 6 The
district court declared that the complaint alleged both wrongfully
induced purchasing and wrongfully induced holding, only the for-
mer of which was preempted by SLUSA. 7 After dismissal with
leave to amend, Dabit filed an amended complaint, aimed at
avoiding SLUSA preemption, which referenced a class of brokers
who had suffered damages from the continued ownership of secu-
rities as opposed to the purchase of securities.8 The case was
transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, where Merrill Lynch filed a second motion to
dismiss. 9  Senior Judge Pollock granted the motion because
Dabit's allegations fell "squarely within SLUSA's ambit."'
10
Dabit appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit." He argued that SLUSA did not preempt the
state law action because his complaint did not allege fraudulent
behavior with regard to the purchase or sale of securities. 12 The
issue was whether the holding of securities fell within the pre-
emption realm of SLUSA, when the language of the Act referred
only to the "purchase or sale of' securities.13 Although the circuit
court stated that the phrase "in connection with the purchase or
sale of' must be interpreted loosely, it remarked that its reach was
not unlimited.14  With reasonable limits in mind, the court
adopted the constraint on private federal securities actions that
the United States Supreme Court had ratified in Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,15 which applied only to those who
"are themselves purchasers or sellers of the securities in ques-
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1)(A) (2000).
6. Merrill Lynch, 126 S. Ct. at 1508. Merrill Lynch also argued that the claim was not
cognizable under Oklahoma law, but the court was unimpressed by this argument. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. Several other suits based on allegations similar to Dabit's had been filed; all
were transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
for consolidated pretrial proceedings. Id.
10. Id. (quoting In re Merrill Lynch & Co., 2003 WL 1872820, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10,
2003)).
11. Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 395 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 2005), vacated,
126 S. Ct. 1503 (2006).
12. Dabit, 395 F.3d at 28. Dabit contended that SLUSA's preemption provision did not
apply because the class alleged fraud that caused members to keep overvalued stocks,
resulting in "holding" damages. Id. The class also sought unearned commissions for clien-
tele that departed after the publication of Merrill Lynch's alleged overvaluation. Id.
13. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1)(A) (2000)).
14. Id. at 37 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1)(A)).
15. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
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tion."16 Using the Blue Chip limitation, Dabit's allegation of fraud
relating to the holding of overvalued securities fell outside the
preemption dominion of SLUSA, 17 which allowed the class action
to proceed.' 8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address
whether the alleged fraud was "in connection with the purchase or
sale" of securities when the damages alleged came not from buying
or selling securities, but from holding them too long. 19
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. 20 As the Sec-
ond Circuit had stated, to trigger SLUSA's preemption provision:
(1) the principal suit must be "a covered class action";21 (2) the
action must relate to "a covered security";22 (3) the charge must be
based on state or local law; and (4) the defendant must have omit-
ted or misrepresented a material fact or used a manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance "in connection with the purchase
or sale of' the security at issue. 23 The Court asserted that the is-
sue was whether the supposed fraud was truly "in connection with
the purchase or sale of' securities, when Dabit was allegedly dam-
aged as a holder. 24 Dabit argued that the relevant language
should be interpreted narrowly, like the purchaser-seller limita-
tion the Court ratified in Blue Chip.25 The Court rejected this ar-
gument, holding that with respect to preemption by SLUSA, the
distinction between purchaser, seller, and holder was irrelevant. 
26
To arrive at its decision, the Court first looked at the acts prom-
ulgated to protect the market for nationally traded securities.
27
16. Dabit, 395 F.3d at 37.
17. Id. at 44.
18. Id. at 47. The appellate court affirmed the district court judgment in part because
some of the class members were considered purchasers, which warranted preemption under
SLUSA. Id. at 46. Dabit was permitted to file a second amended complaint excluding
them. Id.
19. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S. Ct. 1503, 1512 (2006).
20. Merrill Lynch, 126 S. Ct. at 1506 (all members joined except Alito, J., who took no
part in the consideration or decision of the case).
21. Dabit, 395 F.3d at 33. A "covered class action" - in relevant part - is one in which
the damage-seeking class is comprised of more than fifty people. Merrill Lynch, 126 S. Ct.
at 1512 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(B) (2000)).
22. Dabit, 395 F.3d at 33. A "covered security" is nationally traded and listed on a
national exchange. Merrill Lynch, 126 S. Ct. at 1412 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(E)).
23. Dabit, 395 F.3d at 33 (citing Riley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
292 F.3d 1334, 1342 (11th Cir. 2002)).
24. Merrill Lynch, 126 S. Ct. at 1512.
25. Id. (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975)).
26. Id. at 1515.
27. Id. at 1510. After the collapse of the stock market in 1929 and the Great Depres-
sion, Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Id. at 1509.
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5 28 out-
lawed fraudulent practices "in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security."29 Later, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.30 limited the reach of
the private right of action under Rule 10b-5 so that it could be in-
voked only "by a purchaser or seller of securities to remedy fraud
associated with his or her own sale or purchase of securities."
' 31
Many lower court decisions adopted the inflexible Birnbaum
limitation, while other cases endorsed a broader reading of the "in
connection with" language. 32 These inconsistent interpretations
set the stage for the Court to make a decisive ruling on whether a
Rule 10b-5 claim was available to any party who suffered harm for
its violation, or only to those who were purchasers or sellers. 33
In Blue Chip, 34 the Court chose to limit the private remedy for a
Rule 10b-5 violation to the purchasers and sellers of the security
in question.35 The rationale of the Blue Chip decision, like Birn-
baum, was based on the idea of curbing vexatious litigation.
36
28. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006). This regulation provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a mate-
rial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.
Id. Rule 10b-5 was born in 1942 out of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Merrill Lynch, 126 S. Ct. at 1509 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000)).
29. Merrill Lynch, 126 S. Ct. at 1509-10 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5). The private
right of action under Rule 10b-5 is not express; it was court-created in Kardon v. Nat'l
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946), and endorsed by the Court in Superin-
tendent of Ins. of N.Y v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971). Merrill Lynch, 126 S.
Ct. at 1509.
30. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
31. Merrill Lynch, 126 S. Ct. at 1509-10 (citing Birnbaum, 193 F.2d 461).
32. Id. at 1510 (citing Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 12-13 (interpreting the coverage of Rule
lob-5 broadly, prohibiting "deceptive practices touching [a victim's] sale of securities as an
investor.")).
33. Id. at 1510.
34. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
35. Merrill Lynch, 126 S. Ct. at 1510.
36. Id. Justice Stevens wrote:
The main policy consideration tipping the scales in favor of precedent was the
widespread recognition that 'litigation under Rule 10b-5 presents a danger of
vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that which accompanies liti-
gation in general." Even weak cases brought under the Rule may have sub-
stantial settlement value . . . because "[tihe very pendency of the lawsuit may
frustrate or delay normal business activity." Cabining the private cause of ac-
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Similar policy considerations prompted Congress to enact the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act of 199537 ("Reform Act").
38
While Rule 10b-5 confers a right of action for fraud in securities
trading, the Reform Act limits the abuse of class actions under the
Rule by imposing heightened requirements and related sanc-
tions. 39 The consequence of the Reform Act was unexpected. 40
Plaintiffs started bringing their securities fraud claims under
state law to avoid the burdens of the Reform Act. 41 Faced with the
frustration of the Reform Act's objectives, Congress enacted
SLUSA, 42 which preempts state law with federal law (i.e., it im-
poses the requirements of the Reform Act) for covered state-law
class action securities fraud claims.
43
Dabit argued that his cause of action was not preempted by
SLUSA because the class did not allege fraud "in connection with
the purchase or sale of' securities; rather, it alleged fraud in con-
nection with the holding of securities. 44 The argument was based
on the decision in Blue Chip, where the Court narrowly inter-
preted the same language with respect to litigation under Rule
10b-5. 4 5 The Court rejected Dabit's argument, stating that "[t]he
tion by means of the purchaser-seller limitation would, in the Court's view,
minimize these ill effects.
Id. at 1510 (citations omitted).
37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 78u-4 (1998).
38. Merrill Lynch, 126 S. Ct. at 1511. The courts had been seeing an influx of class
action securities litigation characterized by "nuisance filings, [the] targeting of deep-pocket
defendants, [and] vexatious discovery requests." Id. at 1510-11.
39. Id. Title I of the Act requires heightened pleading requirements for actions brought
pursuant to Rule 10b-5 and/or § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. The
Reform Act imposes penalties for frivolous claims, limits recoverable damages, and author-
izes a stay of discovery pending the resolution of a dismissal motion. Id.
40. Id. at 1511.
41. Id.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1)(A) (2000). The pertinent language of the Act is as follows:
CLASS ACTION LIMITATIONS.-. No covered class action based upon the
statutory or common law of any State or subdivision thereof may be maintained
in any State or Federal court by any private party alleging--
(A) a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with the
purchase or sale of a covered security; or
(B) that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1) (emphasis added).
43. Merrill Lynch, 126 S. Ct. at 1511.
44. Id. at 1512 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1)(A)).
45. Id. This is the interpretation the Second Circuit used in Dabit V. Merrill Lynch,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 395 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 2005), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 1503 (2006). Merrill
Lynch, 126 S. Ct. at 1512.
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background, the text, and the purpose of SLUSA's preemption
provision all support [a] broader interpretation."
46
The foundation of Dabit's argument - SLUSA's background -
crumbled when Justice Stevens rejected Dabit's reasoning, given
the Court's assumption that the holding in Blue Chip had
stemmed from the text of Rule 10b-5. 47 Justice Stevens explained
that the ruling in Blue Chip was based not on formulating a defi-
nition for the "in connection with the purchase or sale of' phrase,
but instead on policy considerations necessitating a defined scope
of the private right of action under Rule 10b-5.48 He noted further
that historically the Court had interpreted the phrase broadly,
rejecting narrow interpretations in SEC v. Zandford49 and in Su-
perintendent of Insurance of New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty
Co. 50 Justice Stevens stated that the identity of the plaintiff was
not controlling, as long as the alleged fraud coincided with a secu-
rities transaction.
51
Turning to the text of the Act, Justice Stevens pointed out that
Congress must have been aware of the phrase's broad construction
when it wrote "in connection with the purchase or sale" into the
key terms of SLUSA.52 According to the general presumption,
when an interpretation by the judiciary becomes established
within the meaning of a statute, Congress' subsequent use of iden-
tical language shows its intent to integrate the Court's interpreta-
tion as well. 53 Not only was the language identical, the SLUSA
provision appeared in the same statute as § 10(b). 54 Utilizing an-
other rule of statutory construction, the Court noted that, in in-
stances where identical language is used in different parts of the
46. Merrill Lynch, 126 S. Ct. at 1507.
47. Id. at 1512.
48. Id. Justice Stevens noted that any uncertainty regarding the "in connection with"
language had been settled by the time SLUSA was enacted. Id. (citing United States v.
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 656 (1997) (holding that the "in connection with" element is satis-
fied when fraud is used in the buying or selling of securities); Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot.
Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 285 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (holding that the plaintiff need
not be a purchaser or seller to have standing for a RICO claim asserting the violation of
fraud in the sale of securities); United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 774 (1979) (holding
that the element of § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 that requires fraud in relation to
the purchaser is met when the fraud was committed against a broker, who suffered in
turn)).
49. 535 U.S. 813 (2002).
50. Merrill Lynch, 126 S. Ct. at 1513 (citing Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers
Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 (1971)).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. (quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 645 (1998)).
54. Id.
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same statute, the general presumption is that it carries the same
meaning. 5
5
Justice Stevens next turned to the purpose behind the enact-
ment of SLUSA.56 He stated that the narrow reading of the stat-
ute proposed by Dabit "would undercut the effectiveness of the
1995 Reform Act and.., run contrary to SLUSA's stated purpose"
- to prevent plaintiffs from bringing class action suits in state
courts to avoid the burdens of the Reform Act.57 Further, a nar-
row construction would interfere with Congress' intent to have
national standards governing class action lawsuits for nationally
traded securities. 5
8
Before concluding, Justice Stevens made clear that the Court
had not forgotten the general rule that "Congress does not cava-
lierly preempt state-law causes of action."59 Keeping that in mind,
the rule was less forceful in this instance than in others because
SLUSA did not, in reality, preempt a state cause of action; it
merely denied plaintiffs the ability to use a class action in certain
instances. 60 Further, Congress had refrained from casting too
wide a net by tailoring exceptions to SLUSA's coverage. 61 Finally,
the Court stated that SLUSA did not preempt "a historically en-
trenched state-law remedy." 62  Justice Stevens concluded by de-
claring that, since there was no relevant distinction between a
class action securities fraud claim brought by holders or by pur-
chasers or sellers, Dabit's complaint fell into the realm of SLUSA,
and his state-law claim was preempted by federal law - here the
Reform Act. 63
55. Merrill Lynch, 126 S. Ct. at 1513.
56. Id. at 1513-14.
57. Id. at 1513. Referring to a narrow construction, the Court noted that it would be
odd to exempt class actions of holders from SLUSA's reach when they threaten "vexatious
litigation." Id. at 1514.
58. Id. at 1514 (citing H.R. REP. No. 105-640, at 10 (1998) (stating the need to make
the federal court the sole venue for class action securities fraud claims)).
59. Id. (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
60. Merrill Lynch, 126 S. Ct. at 1514. For example, SLUSA permitted the enforcement
of a state-law securities fraud claim, as long as the group was comprised of less than fifty
plaintiffs. Id.
61. Id. SLUSA exempts: (1) state-law class actions where the issuer of the security is
incorporated; (2) claims by a state agency or pension plan; (3) actions pursuant to contracts
between issuers and indenture trustees; and (4) derivative actions brought by shareholders
on behalf of a corporation. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(3)(A)-(C), (f)(5)(C) (2000)).
62. Id. at 1514-15. Before the passage of the Reform Act, class action securities claims
were primarily brought in federal court. Id. (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-803, at 14
(1998)).
63. Id. at 1515.
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Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 did not
declare any conduct unlawful. 64 Instead, it gave the SEC the
power to make rules to stop deceptive practices in the buying and
selling of securities. 65 Rule 10b-5 was promulgated pursuant to §
10(b) of the Act, 66 and generally forbids fraud in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security. 67 Regarding 10b-5, two com-
mentators have noted that "it is difficult to think of another in-
stance in the entire corpus juris in which the interaction of the
legislative, administrative rulemaking, and judicial processes has
produced so much from so little. What is more remarkable is that
the whole development was unplanned."
68
One branch of the "judicial oak which [had] grown from little
more than a legislative acorn"69 was the interpretation of the
phrase "in connection with the purchase or sale of securities."70 In
1952, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
dealt with the phrase's meaning in Birnbaum.
71
64. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir. 1952).
65. Birnbaum, 193 F.2d at 463.
66. Id.
67. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).
68. Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 936
(5th ed. 2004). Loss recalls a detailed account of the administrative enactment of 10b-5, as
given by M. Freeman:
It was one day in the year [1942], I was sitting in my office in the S.E.C. build-
ing in Philadelphia and I received a call from Jim Treanor who was then the
Director of the Trading and Exchange Division. He said, "I have just been on
the telephone with Paul Rowen," who was then the S.E.C. Regional Adminis-
trator in Boston, "and he has told me about the president of some company in
Boston who is going around buying up the stock of his company from his share-
holders at $4.00 a share, and he has been telling them that the company is do-
ing very badly, whereas, in fact, the earnings are going to be quadrupled and
will be $2.00 a share for this coming year. Is there anything we can do about
itT' So he came upstairs and I called in my secretary and I looked at Section
10(b) and I looked at Section 17, and I put them together, and the only discus-
sion we had there was where "in connection with the purchase or sale" should
be, and we decided that it should be at the end.
We called the Commission and we got on the calendar, and I don't remember
whether we got there that morning or after lunch. We passed a piece of paper
around to all the commissioners. All the commissioners read the rule and they
tossed it on the table, indicating approval. Nobody said anything except Sum-
ner Pike who said, "Well," he said, "we are against fraud, aren't we?" That is
how it happened.
Id. at 937-38 (citing A.B.A. SEC. OF CORP., BANKING & Bus. LAW, Conference on the Codifi-
cation of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 BUS. LAW. 793, 921-23 (1967)).
69. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
referring to the legal developments that have sprung from the enactment of Rule 10b-5).
70. Birnbaum, 193 F.2d at 462-63.
71. Id. at 463.
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The defendants in Birnbaum, C. Russell Feldman, the Newport
Steel Corporation, and the Wilport Company, were sued by the
stockholders of the Newport Steel Corporation for a violation of
Rule 10b-5. 72 Feldman owned forty percent of the Newport Steel
common stock, giving him voting control, and was president of the
company and chairman of its board of directors. 73 From June to
August, 1950, Newport Steel had been engaged in merger talks
with the Follansbee Steel Corporation. 74 Under its proposed
terms, the merger would have been highly lucrative to Newport
stockholders. 75
In an unexpected move, Feldman rejected the Follansbee offer
and sold his Newport shares for twice the market value to Wilport
Company, an alliance of ten raw steel users; Feldman then re-
signed as president. 76 The sale gave Wilport control of Newport
Steel during a period of low supply.77 The plaintiffs alleged fraud
under Rule 10b-5. 78 In response, the defendants argued that the
plaintiffs were not purchasers or sellers under the rule, and thus
lacked standing to bring suit. 79
The Second Circuit agreed with the defendants, admitting that
the rule "may have been somewhat loosely drawn," but that its
scope and meaning were ascertainable when viewed in reference
to the SEC regulatory scheme and under the purpose for which
Rule 10b-5 had been adopted.80 The court explained that, before
Rule 10b-5 was enacted, § 17(a)81 of the 1933 Act and § 15(c) 8 2 of
72. Id. at 462. Newport Steel manufactured steel for sale to the manufacturers of fin-
ished products. Id.
73. Id. Other defendants were Stamm, Aheim, Rohr, Lorenzen, Shaffer, and Ballan-
tyne, all directors of Newport who were under the control of Feldman. Id.
74. Id.
75. Birnbaum, 193 F.2d at 462.
76. Id. The directors of Wilport, also defendants, took the place of Feldman and the
directors under his control following the sale. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. The complaint detailed an August 3, 1950 letter from Feldman, stating to the
Newport shareholders that negotiations with Follansbee were suspended due to the "uncer-
tain international situation." Id. Gibson, who took over as president of Newport, reported
the stock sale to the plaintiffs in a September 14, 1950 letter, but failed to state the price or
the fact that Newport would become a subsidiary of Wilport. Id.
79. Id.
80. Birnbaum, 193 F.2d. at 463.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2000). The Act states:
(a) Use of interstate commerce for purpose of fraud or deceit
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities or any
security-based swap agreement (as defined in section 206B of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act) by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or by use of the mails, directly or indi-
rectly
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the 1934 Act were the only proscriptions against fraudulent secu-
rities sales or purchases.8 3 Section 17(a) banned the deception of
securities purchasers, and § 15(c) covered fraud by dealers or bro-
kers in over-the-counter markets.8 4 The sections did not cover the
fraudulent buying of securities, so the SEC adopted Rule 10b-5.
8 5
Strictly interpreting the SEC's agenda, the Second Circuit held
that Rule 10b-5 protected only defrauded buyers and sellers of
securities. 8 6 This rule, referred to as the Birnbaum rule, governed
the right to sue under Rule 10b-5 and generally became accepted
at the appellate level.
87
Twenty-three years later, the Supreme Court of the United
States narrowly upheld the Birnbaum rule in Blue Chip. 88 In this
case, the Blue Chip Stamp Co. ("Old Blue Chip") had been sued by
the United States in a civil antitrust action.8 9 The suit was ter-
minated by a consent decree whereby Old Blue Chip was to reor-
ganize by merging into Blue Chip Stamps, a newly formed corpo-
ration. 90 Under the consent decree, Blue Chip Stamps was to offer
a substantial amount of its common stock to non-shareholder re-
tailers who had used the stamp service in the past. 91 The plan
was executed, a prospectus was issued to the offerees, and over
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading; or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (emphasis added).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (2000).
83. Birnbaum, 193 F.2d at 463.
84. Id.
85. Id. The court noted that the SEC was attempting to make the prohibitions of §
17(a) applicable to buyers. Id. A comparison of the language of § 17(a) and Rule 10b-5 is
illustrative of this intention. Id.
86. Id. at 464. Responding to the plaintiffs' argument that a narrow interpretation
would not effectuate the SEC's goal via the Act of 1934 to "protect investors from exploita-
tion by corporate insiders," the court stated that legislative history and the purpose behind
Rule 10b-5 were not sufficiently persuasive to show that 10b-5 was enacted to reach that
end. Id.
87. LoSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 68, at 1041. The Seventh Circuit was the only circuit
that rejected the rule in Eason v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir.
1973). LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 68, at 1041.
88. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
89. Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 725.
90. Id. at 725-26.
91. Id. at 726. The shares of the majority holders of Old Blue Chip stock were reduced
under the reorganization. Id. The offerings to non-holders were proportional to past stamp
usage. Id.
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fifty percent of the shares offered were bought. 92 The plaintiff, an
offeree who chose not to buy, sued Blue Chip Stamps under Rule
10b-5, alleging that the prospectus was overly pessimistic and ma-
terially affected his decision not to buy. 93
The issue before the Court was whether the plaintiff could sue
under Rule 10b-5 when the plaintiff had neither purchased nor
sold the securities in the prospectus. 94 Justice Rehnquist deliv-
ered the majority opinion of the Supreme Court. 95 He began by
briefly tracing the development of federal securities laws through
the enactment of Rule 10b-5 and issued a reminder that the pri-
vate right to action under the Rule was court created.96
Based on the circuit courts' longstanding acceptance of the
Birnbaum rule, coupled with the fact that Congress had never re-
jected it, Justice Rehnquist declared strong support for Birnbaum
in the Supreme Court. 97 Next, Justice Rehnquist turned to the
congressional scheme of securities regulation, emphasizing that
"[w]hen Congress wished to provide a remedy to those who neither
purchase[d] nor [sold] securities, it had little trouble in doing so
expressly."
98
Further, if the Court implied a private right of action for a
plaintiff who neither bought nor sold, a conflict would arise with
92. Id.
93. Id. at 726-27. The nine retailers who owned ninety percent of Blue Chip Stamps
were also named as defendants. Id. at 725. The plaintiff alleged that the prospectus was
overly pessimistic in order to keep the retailers from buying so that the public could pur-
chase the offerings later at higher prices. Id. at 726-27. The plaintiff sought $21.4 million
in damages for the lost chance to buy, $25 million in exemplary damages, and the opportu-
nity to buy the stocks at the price offered in the prospectus. Id.
94. Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 727. The case had been dismissed by the district court,
Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 339 F. Supp. 35 (C.D. Cal. 1971). The Ninth
Circuit reversed, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973), based on the majority's view that the plain-
tiff's rights as a potential beneficiary under the consent decree fell under an exception to
Birnbaum that protected non-buyers and non-sellers who owned contractual rights to buy
or sell. Manor Drug, 492 F.2d at 142.
95. Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 725. (Powell, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Stewart
& Marshall, JJ., joined; Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Douglas & Bren-
nan, JJ., joined).
96. Id. at 729-30. The private right of action under Rule 10b-5 is not express; it was
created by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in
Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946), and endorsed by the
Supreme Court in Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6
(1971). Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 729-30. Justice Rehnquist noted that, if Congress had ex-
pressly created a private right of action under 10b-5, the Court would not have modified its
bounds. Id. at 748-49.
97. Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 733.
98. Id. at 734 (alteration in original). Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act granted an express
private right of action against corporate insiders engaged in securities fraud. Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1952).
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the 1934 Act, which limited damages to those actually suffered by
the plaintiff.99 Also, if the Court allowed a suit without a pur-
chase or sale, it would render useless the provision of the 1934 Act
that made violative trades voidable, 10 0 which had justified an im-
plied private right of action under Rule 10b-5 in the first place.101
Further, Congress had already limited plaintiff standing in the
private causes of action it expressly authorized to purchasers and
sellers, so it would have been inconsistent to expand the plaintiff
class beyond that scope for a court-created private right of ac-
tion. 10 2 That said, Justice Rehnquist admitted that an exploration
of congressional intent was not dispositive with regard to the
bounds of Rule 10b-5, considering its growth by way of decisional
law since 1942.103 Thus, the policy considerations behind Rule
10b-5 warranted examination.1
0 4
The three classes of would-be plaintiffs that were barred by the
Birnbaum rule included: (1) potential purchasers who chose not to
buy based on fraudulent representation or omission; (2) share-
holders who chose not to sell for the same reason(s); and (3)
shareholders who suffered a loss from corporate activities or in-
sider activities that violated Rule 10b-5.105 Members of the second
and third classes could potentially bring a derivative action, 10 6 but
the first class was completely barred. 107 For this reason, the Birn-
baum rule was commonly called an "arbitrary restriction."
108
However, Justice Rehnquist concluded that, despite these dis-
advantages, on balance the rule remained advantageous. 109 In an
99. Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 734-35. In § 28(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a)
(2000), private remedies were limited to "actual damages." Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 734-35.
This impliedly required an ascertainable number of trades in order to compute a remedy.
Id. If recovery were allowed by a plaintiff who neither bought nor sold, damage amounts
would be hypothetical based on the plaintiffs estimate. Id.
100. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b).
101. Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 735.
102. Id. at 735-36 (referring to the 1933 and 1934 Acts).
103. Id. at 737 ('"When we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a
judicial oak that has grown from little more than a legislative acorn. Such growth may be
quite consistent with the congressional enactment and with the role of the federal judiciary
in interpreting it . .
104. Id.
105. Id. at 737-38.
106. Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 738. A derivative action is "[a] suit by a beneficiary of a
fiduciary to enforce a right belonging to the fiduciary; esp., a suit asserted by a shareholder
on the corporation's behalf against a third party (usu. a corporate officer) because of the
corporation's failure to take some action against the third party." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 475 (8th ed. 2004).
107. Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 738.
108. Id. at 738-39.
109. Id. at 739.
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explanatory footnote, Justice Rehnquist stated that the disadvan-
tages of the rule were alleviated to some extent because remedies
were obtainable for non-purchasers and non-sellers under state
law. 110 Justice Rehnquist noted that the primary policy consid-
eration in favor of the Birnbaum rule was the "danger of vexatious
litigation which could result from a widely expanded class of
plaintiffs under Rule 10b-5." 111 The two-pronged basis for the
aforementioned danger was the potential for strike suits and the
difficulty of proving facts where there was no transaction. 112
The majority in Blue Chip explained that in a strike suit, a
plaintiff with an objectively small chance of winning nevertheless
enjoyed a settlement value out of proportion to his potential for
success because he could not be stopped by summary judgment. 113
Intertwined with the difficulties associated with strike suits was
the potential for abuse of discovery under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 114 Also, a Rule 10b-5 claim without the Birn-
baum rule turned on whose testimony the jury decided to be-
lieve. 115 The court would have almost no power to enjoin a case,
no matter how weak it was, other than through settlement.
116
Justice Rehnquist admitted that there was no general rule to in-
terpret the law so that a defendant could more easily obtain sum-
mary judgment. 117 However, the potential for strike suits in secu-
rities fraud claims made the Birnbaum rule and the possibility of
excluding some legitimate plaintiffs the lesser of evils. 118
The second basis for fear of vexatious litigation absent the Birn-
baum rule was the idea that the trier of fact would be faced with
"rather hazy issues of historical fact[,] the proof of which [would
depend] almost entirely on oral testimony." 19 Justice Rehnquist
drew a distinction between the tort of misrepresentation and de-
110. Id. at 739 n.9.
111. Id. at 740.
112. Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 740-43.
113. Id. at 740. Justice Rehnquist noted that Congress adopted a provision aimed at
curbing strike suits in the expressly conferred private causes of action granted in the 1933
Act. Id. at 741 (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548-49 (1949)). Ac-
cording to Justice Rehnquist, that fact alone warranted opposition to strike suits in Blue
Chip where the private right was judicially implied. Id. at 740.
114. Id. at 741.
115. Id. at 742.
116. Id. The Birnbaum rule, however, was a standing requirement that could be verified
using objective documentation. Id.
117. Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 742-43.
118. Id. at 743.
119. Id. (alteration in original).
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ceit versus a Rule 10b-5 claim. 120 The rules of standing in a deceit
claim had been peeled back over time, moving away from limita-
tions like the Birnbaum rule. 121 Justice Rehnquist explained that
the Birnbaum rule could not be relaxed because the state of the
modern commercial transaction caused the dissemination of stock
advice to millions of potential investors.122 Under the rule, only
plaintiffs who have dealt in the security to which the fraud relates
could bring suit; that was the value of Birnbaum.123 Thus, the
majority concluded that the Birnbaum rule should be followed
based on policy considerations, the intent of Congress, and histori-
cal support of the rule. 124 After admitting potential mitigating
circumstances, 125 the Court decreed that an exception to Birn-
baum would not be made for fear of leaving the rule "open to end-
less case-by-case erosion."'
126
120. Id. at 744-45.
121. Id. at 744. The privity limitation was eliminated, as well as the requirement that
the misrepresentation be of fact instead of opinion. Id. Also, a misrepresentation and
deceit cause of action could be brought for wrongly induced refusal to buy or sell. Id.
122. Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 745-46.
123. Id. at 747. Justice Rehnquist's explanation was as follows:
But in the absence of the Birnbaum rule, it would be sufficient for a plaintiff to
prove that he had failed to purchase or sell stock by reason of a defendant's vio-
lation of Rule 10b-5. The manner in which the defendant's violation caused the
plaintiff to fail to act could be as a result of the reading of a prospectus, as re-
spondent claims here, but it could just as easily come as a result of a claimed
reading of information contained in the financial pages of a local newspaper.
Plaintiffs proof would not be that he purchased or sold stock, a fact which
would be capable of documentary verification in most situations, but instead
that he decided not to purchase or sell stock. Plaintiffs entire testimony could
be dependent upon uncorroborated oral evidence of many of the crucial ele-
ments of his claim, and still be sufficient to go to the jury. The jury would not
even have the benefit of weighing the plaintiffs version against the defendant's
version, since the elements to which the plaintiff would testify would be in
many cases totally unknown and unknowable to the defendant. The very real
risk in permitting those in respondent's position to sue under Rule 10b-5 is that
the door will be open to recovery of substantial damages on the part of one who
offers only his own testimony to prove that he ever consulted a prospectus of
the issuer, that he paid any attention to it, or that the representations con-
tained in it damaged him.
Id. at 745-46.
124. Id. at 749.
125. Id. at 755. The plaintiff corporation in Blue Chip had a prior connection to the
defendants, was an intended beneficiary under the consent agreement, was significantly
smaller (as a corporation) than a class attributing fraud to a newspaper's financial pages,
and its manager(s) had probably in fact read the allegedly fraudulent prospectus. Id. at
754.
126. Id. at 755. Applying the facts of the case to the majority holding, the plaintiff was
barred from suing under Rule lOb-5 because it was not a purchaser or seller. Id.
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Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Douglas and Justice Bren-
nan, dissented. 127 Justice Blackmun protested the Court's en-
dorsement of an "arbitrary principle of standing." 128 Responding
to the majority rationale, the dissent argued three points, begin-
ning with the majority's reliance on inclusive legislative history. 129
The dissent also claimed that reliance on the Birnbaum holding
was misplaced because it was decided under dissimilar circum-
stances, and that the majority employed hypothetical considera-
tions of policy based on the difference between meritorious and
meritless claims under Rule 10b-5.130
According to the dissent, an anomaly resulted from refusing to
acknowledge the plaintiff as party to the sale when the purpose of
the scheme was to prevent the plaintiff from ever becoming a
buyer.131 Instead of defining sale as "a single, individualized act
transferring property from one party to another," Justice Black-
mun defined it as a "generalized event of public disposal of prop-
erty through advertisement, auction, or some other market
mechanism."'132 With this definition in mind, Justice Blackmun
presented his own formulation of the proper test for Rule 10b-5
standing where the plaintiff was required to show only a "logical
nexus between the alleged fraud and the purchase or sale of a se-
curity."133
Armed with the majority's holding in Blue Chip, the plaintiff
class in Merrill Lynch argued that SLUSA did not preempt state
law. 134 The Court in Blue Chip had decided that the phrase "in
connection with the purchase or sale of" meant that the plaintiff
must either be a purchaser or seller (not a holder) in the allegedly
fraudulent transaction.135 SLUSA employed the same phrase, so
Dabit argued that a holder class must not be subject to its pre-
127. Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 761 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 761-62.
130. Id. at 762. The dissent pointed to a collection of literature since Birnbaum that had
been critical of the rule. Id. at 769. Regarding its policy rationale, the dissent explained
that the fears of the majority regarding litigation difficulties under 10b-5 without the Birn-
baum limitation were overblown, "as if all these [had been] unknown to lawsuits taking
place in America's courthouses everyday." Id. Further, if Birnbaum were overruled, the
dissent argued, courts would develop rational standards of proof to impede meritless
claims. Id. at 771.
131. Id. at 765.
132. Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 764 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 770. Using this test, the complaint in Blue Chip would not have been dis-
missed. Id. at 771.
134. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S. Ct. 1503, 1512 (2006).
135. Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 755.
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emption power. 136 However, the Court explained that it had relied
on policy considerations, not the meaning of the "in connection
with" phrase, in deciding Blue Chip. 137 Thus, the Court held that
SLUSA preempted holder claims as well as those of purchaser and
seller. 138
It is important to understand the major implication of the deci-
sion in Merrill Lynch. Suppose hypothetical plaintiff Carl Fox and
forty-nine other similarly situated shareholders (hereinafter
"Fox") each own five-hundred shares of Red Eye Airlines (herein-
after "Red Eye"). Stock tycoon, Gekko, trying to stop a mass exo-
dus of investors from his broker's favorite airline, fraudulently
and collusively orchestrates the issuance of an overly optimistic
financial report to Red Eye shareholders. In fact, the financial
report makes no mention of a recent $100 million judgment ren-
dered against Red Eye. Fox relies on the report and keeps stock
that he would have sold had he known the truth. When news of
the judgment hits newsstands a week later, the value of Red Eye
stock plummets.
When Fox realizes that he has been duped, he brings a state
class action securities fraud claim against Gekko and Red Eye to
recover his loss. Since Fox is a holder, the court determines that
under Merrill Lynch, his claim is preempted by federal securities
law. Fox therefore brings the action under (federal) Rule 10b-5.
However, the federal district court determines that Fox cannot
proceed because, under Blue Chip, the plaintiff must have been a
purchaser or seller, and Fox was neither. The result is that post-
Merrill Lynch there can be no class action securities fraud claims
by "holders." The Court's decision leaves those like Fox - holders
whose relative stake in the suit's outcome makes it too risky or
expensive to sue unless part of a class action - with no recourse.
Even considering Fox's predicament, and assuming securities
regulation is necessary, 139 the Supreme Court made the right de-
136. Merrill Lynch, 126 S. Ct. at 1512.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. It is widely accepted by economists that securities regulation is generally unneces-
sary. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 198 (2nd Prtg. 1974). The extensive
regulation of an otherwise free market was spurred by the 1929 stock market crash. Id.
The idea was that sharply falling stock prices had caused the crash, so regulations were
enacted to prevent such a crash from happening again. Id. Economists consider such rea-
soning a fallacy because they do not attribute the stock market crash to a precipitous fall in
stock prices; instead they accredit it to an expected decline in economic activity. Id. The
SEC regulations, which are supposed to increase the flow of information and therefore
strengthen consumer confidence, are viewed by economists as nothing more than govern-
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cision in Merrill Lynch. The Court's holdings in Blue Chip and
Merrill Lynch relied on the policy-based idea that strike suits
must be curbed. 140 If the Court in Merrill Lynch did not plug what
was perceived to be the "holdings" claim exception to SLUSA, the
aforementioned policy would have been left with a major leak.
The decision in Blue Chip (to adhere to the Birnbaum rule) was
based on the "danger of vexatious litigation which could result
from a widely expanded class of plaintiffs under Rule lOb-5."'1' A
major component of the aforementioned danger was the potential
for strike suits. 142 But the threat of strike suits did not die after
Blue Chip.143 Hence, the Reform Act was enacted, which imposed
heightened requirements and related sanctions on class action
securities fraud claims. 144 If the Court had held differently in
Merrill Lynch, class action holder claims could proceed at the state
level, and the Court's goal of deterring strike suits would be left
unfulfilled.
Admittedly, the holding in Merrill Lynch creates an anomaly by
defining "in connection with the purchase or sale of' differently
than in Blue Chip. However, the Court's decision avoided creating
an even greater anomaly. Consider the following plaintiff classes
in relation to the holdings in Blue Chip and Merrill Lynch: (1)
shareholders who were fraudulently induced not to buy; (2) share-
holders who bought induced by fraud; (3) shareholders encouraged
via fraud to hold onto overvalued stocks; and (4) shareholders who
sold induced by fraud. Under the ruling in Blue Chip, only the
shareholders in groups (2) and (4) have a federal cause of action
under Rule 10b-5.145 If the Merrill Lynch Court had accepted
Dabit's argument, it would have allowed the holding in Blue Chip
(which was meant to limit the plaintiffs who can bring a 10b-5
claim to groups (2) and (4)) to be used as an escape hatch through
which "holdings" plaintiffs in group (3) could avoid being subjected
to the Blue Chip decision. In other words, the Court in Merrill
Lynch had to choose whether it would allow its decision in Blue
ment prodding in markets where information is already abundant due to free competition.
Id.
140. Merrill Lynch, 126 S. Ct. at 1513-14; Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 740-43.
141. Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 740.
142. Id. at 740-43. See supra notes 113-118 and accompanying text.
143. Merrill Lynch, 126 S. Ct. at 1510. The courts had been seeing an influx of class
action securities litigation characterized by "nuisance filings, [the] targeting of deep-pocket
defendants, [and] vexatious discovery requests." Id. at 1510-11.
144. Id. at 1511.
145. Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 755. The Court limited the cause of action under Rule 10b-5
to sellers and purchasers. Id.
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Chip to be used by holders in order to avoid the Blue Chip holding
or to completely extricate class action securities fraud claims
brought by holders. The Court chose the latter in the name of
curbing vexatious litigation. 146
In effect, the holding in Merrill Lynch was no more than judicial
duct tape used to patch the effects of the admittedly arbitrary
147
yet policy-conscious rule ratified in Blue Chip. Perhaps the great-
est irony in the eyes of a present-day defrauded class of securities
holders with no recourse is the quiet reassurance of the Blue Chip
majority, who explained that the disadvantages of the purchaser-
seller rule would be alleviated to some extent because remedies
were available to non-purchasers and non-sellers under state
law. 148 It is fitting that the Blue Chip Court's reassurance was
hidden in a footnote, because after Merrill Lynch, recourse for a
defrauded class of holders under state law is no longer an option.
Matthew D. Haydo
146. Merrill Lynch, 126 S. Ct. at 1510.
147. Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 738-39.
148. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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